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I. INTRODUCTION
In Hudson v. Palmer,1 the United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4
majority, adopted a "bright-line"2 rule holding that "the fourth
amendment proscription agains unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell."3 Over a vociferous dissent by
Justice Stevens, 4 the Court maintained that "recognition of privacy
rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be recon-
ciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of
I wish to dedicate this Article to my mother Yvonne, and to the found memory of
my father William; for their persistent patience and understanding enabled me.
1. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). While this Article will focus only on the fourth amend-
ment issue decided in Hudson, another important issue was decided. The Court
held that the intentional destruction of an inmate's property by a prison official
will not warrant a § 1983 action for violation of the due process clause if the in-
mate has adequate post-deprivation remedies available. This holding extended
the principle enunciated in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Parratt, the
Court held that a § 1983 action could not be maintained when adequate post-dep-
rivation state remedies existed to compensate an inmate for prison official's negli-
gent loss of an inmate's property.
2. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198 (1984).
3. Id. at 3200.
4. Id. at 3207 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined the dissent.
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penal institutions."5
For the substantial number of citizens that are presently or will in
the future be incarcerated, 6 this "bright-line" rule will have a signifi-
cant impact. Protections for an already vulnerable class of citizens
will be further limited by the withdrawal of the fourth amendment
protections from the prison cell. Prior to Hudson, lower courts, both
state and federal, had determined that prison inmates retained a mini-
mal degree of fourth amendment privacy interest in their prison cells.
These decisions balanced legitimate state interests, primarily the
state's security interest, and an inmate's privacy interest. The mini-
mal scope of fourth amendment protections gleaned from these cased
did not infringe on or interfere with legitimate state penal objectives.
It is the conclusion of this Article that the Supreme Court, in Hudson
v. Palmer, unnecessarily deprived prison inmates of minimal fourth
amendment protections without a concomitant enhancement of the
state's asserted interest in penal security. This conclusion will be sub-
stantiated in subsequent sections that discuss the pre-Hudson case
law, exploring its rationales, analysis, and factual settings. In addition,
the Hudson opinion will be critiqued to demonstrate that the Court
needlessly withdrew the fourth amendment's protection of an in-
mate's privacy in his prison cell.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE PRISON SETTING
PRIOR TO HUDSON V. PALMER
Traditionally, many rights, constitutional or civil, were denied to
the inhabitants of correctional facilities.7 These institutions were ad-
ministered without review by or interference from the judiciary. This
pervasive policy of judicial deference to penal authorities was known
as the "hands off" policy.S It was utilized by courts, which claimed a
lack of expertise in the corrections area, to dismiss inmate suits chal-
lenging the conditions imposed.or the treatment received in correc-
tional institutions.9 Recently, however, the pervasive adherence to
the '"hands off" policy by the judiciary has been mitigated. Though
5. Id. at 3200.
6. In 1983 the inmate population for state and federal prisons was 438,830. Id. at
3214 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE PRISONERS IN 1983 (April 1984)).
7. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), where the court
stated. "He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only
fofeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State." Id. at
796. But see Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1944) (prisoners retain
all rights except those necessarily lost.)
8. See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
9. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954)
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courts still defer to the judgments of corrections administrators,O
when a fundamental constitutional right is at issue courts will review
actions by the penal authorities11 and, if necessary, order remedial
actions.
As was aptly stated by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDon-
nell,12 "there is no iron curtain drawn between the constitution and
the prisons of this country."13 Adhering to the basic premise that "his
[i.e. an inmate's] rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies
of the institutional environment,"' 4 the Court has, nonetheless, deter-
mined that inmates retain first amendment rights of speech15 and reli-
gion,16 due process rights,17 the fourteenth amendment protection
against racial discrimination via the equal protection clause,' 8 and the
right of access to the courts.19 These retained rights, however, are not
as fully exercisable as they would be were the inmate not confined.
The breadth of these rights is assessed against the background of "the
legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution."20
Prior to Hudson, the Court had not determined definitively
("courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with
the ordinary prison rules or regulations.")
10. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court stated:
[Tihe problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a correctional
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.
Id. at 547. Corrections administrators, both federal and state, have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations for the operation of their facilities. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4042 (1982); ALA. CODE § 14-1-8(6) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-11-
5-2 (Burns 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 676 (1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-10
(1984).
11. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970) (indiscriminate
opening and reading of inmate mail a violation of the fourth amendment; the
court must interfere with prison function "by articulating the permissible appli-
cable standards when there has been a deprivation of prisoners' constitutional
rights"). See also United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
12. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
13. Id. at 555-56.
14. Id. at 555.
15. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
16. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
17. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
18. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
19. The right of access to the courts encompasses several features: the right to chal-
lenge the legality of detention, Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549, (1941) ("the state
and its officers may not abridge or impair [a prisoner's] right to apply to a federal
court for a writ of habeus corpus"); the right to inmate assistance, where neces-
sary and reasonable for preparing legal documents, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969); and the right of access to either adequate law libraries or access to
persons adequately trained in law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
20. Wolff v. McDonnell, 441 U.S. 540, 546 (1979). Full exercise of these fundamental
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whether fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search-
ers and seizures extended to an inmate's privacy interest in his prison
cell. The Court had, however, addressed the fourth amendment's ap-
plicability in other prison contexts.
In Stroud v. United States,21 letters voluntarily written by a prison
inmate "came into the possession of the officials of the penitentiary
under established practice, reasonably designed to promote the disci-
pline of the institution."22 Incriminating evidence contained in the
letters was utilized in convicting the inmate for the murder of a prison
guard. Since the letters were not seized "without process," 23 there
was no violation of the fourth amendment's proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.24
In Lanza v. New York,25 the petitioner challenged his conviction
for refusing to answer the questions of a legislative committee investi-
gating corruption in the New York parole system. The questions were
posed from conversations the petitioner had had with his brother, an
inmate, in a visiting room at a state prison. Penal authorities had sur-
reptitiously recorded these conversations. Petitioner challenged his
conviction on fourth amendment grounds. A plurality of the Court
expressed, as dicta, the view that recording the conversations between
a prisoner and a visitor did not violate the fourth amendment.26 The
constitutional rights is restrained by the exigencies of the prison environment
and penal objectives.
21. 251 U.S. 15 (1919) (Stroud was the famous Birdman of Alcatraz).
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id.
24. Accord State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105 (1983) (though inmates retain
some fourth amendment rights, no fourth amendment violation when prisoner
voluntarily gave note to guard for delivery). Contra United States v. Savage, 482
F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973) (interception and photocopying of an inmate's letter vio-
lates the fourth amendment absent a showing of a justifiable purpose of imprison-
ment or security); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970)
(indiscriminate opening and reading of inmate mail is a fourth amendment
violation).
25. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
26. The Court stated that:
[Tio say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's "house" or that it is
a place where he can claim constitutional immunity from search or
seizure of his person, his papers, or his effects, is at best a novel argu-
ment .... Yet, without attempting either to define or to predict the
ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it is obvious that a jail
shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an
office, or a hotel room.
Id. at 143. The plurality used the "constitutionally protected area"' test, which
premised fourth amendment analysis on whether there was a physical intrusion
into a protected area. Property concepts were utilized to determine whether an
area was protected or not, thus, whether fourth amendment protections did or
did not adhere in a specific situation. For example, in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court held that wire-tapping did not violate the fourth
amendment since there was not physical intrusion into petitioner's home, thus no
1985]
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actual opinion, however, upheld the conviction on independent state
grounds.2 7 In a memorandum opinion, Chief Justice Warren took the
plurality to task for its "gratuitous exposition" 28 on important consti-
tutional issues not fully before the Court.29
As stated, prior to Hudson the Court had not specifically deter-
mined whether prison inmates retained any fourth amendment pri-
vacy rights in their cells.30 This vacuum, however, was not left
invasion of a protected area. The "protected areas" test was subsequently ruled
not to be "controlling" for determining whether an individual was entitled to
fourth amendment protections in certain circumstances. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). This Article will further discuss Katz and the potentially
still existent "protected areas" test. See infra notes 127 & 162.
27. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 146 (1962). Two of the questions the petitioner
refused to answer, which refusal he was subsequently convicted for, were based
on information apart from the recorded conversations.
28. This phrase, utilized by Chief Justice Warren in his memorandum opinion, was
borrowed from Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. Id. at 150 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29. Ihe opinion undertakes, as Mr. Justice Brennan characterizes it, a
"gratuitous exposition" upon those more difficult constitutional
problems.... These expressions of dicta are in a form which can only
lead to misunderstanding and confusion in future cases. Such dicta,
when written into our decisions, have an unfortunate way of turning up
in digests and decisions of lower courts; they are often quoted as evidenc-
ing the considered opinion of this Court, and this is so even though such
intention is denied by the writer.
Id. at 148. The concerns of the Chief Justice were well founded. Several subse-
quent cases relied on Lanza as precedent to hold that the fourth amendment did
not apply in prison. See United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Pietraszewski,
285 Minn. 212,172 N.W.2d 758 (1969); Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1975).
30. It is important to recognize that the Hudson decision held that prisoners have no
fourth amendment rights in their prison cells. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194,
3200 (1984). Many courts have found that prisoners retain fourth amendment
rights in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1978) (prisoner body searches subject to fourth amendment protections); Hodges
v. Klein, 412 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976) (fourth amendment protects inmates
against unreasonable strip searches); State v. Nason, 433 A.2d 424 (Me. 1981) (in-
mate retains fourth amendment privacy protections agains unreasonable body
searches; analysis is premised on a totality of the circumstances). See also Fergu-
son v. Cardwell, 392 F. Supp. 750 (D. Ariz. 1975) (extracting blood samples for
drug test subject to fourth amendment); People v. Gibson, 1 PRISON L. REP. 254
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). The Hudson decision cannot be seen as affecting fourth
amendment protections in these areas for several reasons. The Court itself lim-
ited its holding to "the confines of the prison cell," thereby recognizing the lim-
ited scope of the issue before it. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984). In
addition, it is quite arguable that different interests are weighed in determining
whether the fourth amendment protections apply in these situations. Penal au-
thorities might have less of a security interest in an individual's body, whereas an
individual would certainly have a greater privacy interest in his or her body. See
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979) (though body searches do not per se
violate the fourth amendment they must be reasonable in scope, justification, and
place of search). These factors compel the conclusion that the Hudson opinion
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unfilled. A majority of the federal courts of appeals, 31 many federal
district courts,32 and several state courts 33 had held that inmates do
retain some degree of fourth amendment protections in their prison
cells. Analysis of several cases will set forth the degrees of fourth
amendment protection and the rationale for these decisions.
An example of the issues and factors weighed in determining
whether a cell search violated the fourth amendment can be seen in
United States v. Hinckley.34 John Hinckley, unsuccessful assassin of
President Reagan, was confined at a federal penal institution for psy-
cannot automatically be extended to other prison contexts wherein the fourth
amendment has previously been held to apply.
31. See DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983) (inmate retains limited fourth
amendment protections); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982)
(inmate retains a limited fourth amendment protection in prison cell, scope to be
determined on a case by case basis); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (reading and seizure of personal writings violates the fourth amend-
ment); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977) (inmate retains lim-
ited privacy interest in cell); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975)
(inmate retains minimal degree of fourth amendment privacy protections); Han-
sen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974) (fourth amendment available for a suit
seeking return of inmate property). For a Ninth Circuit case holding no fourth
amendment privacy rights in a prison cell, see United States v. Hitchcock, 467
F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972). In an effort to reconcile this apparent conflict in the
Ninth Circuit, it appears that the Hansen court relied upon United States v. Sav-
age, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973) (interception and copying of letter violates the
fourth amendment when no showing of legitimate penal justification), for its
proposition that the fourth amendment applied in prison. It appears to extend
the Savage principle to the prison cell. Hitchcock, on the other hand, relied on
New York v. Lanza, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), to deny an inmate's privacy interest in his
cell. Though Hansen is later in time, it did not even discuss Hitchcock. Arguably,
Hansen could be taken as not applicable to the prison cell, but its ambiguity
leaves room for the assertion that it does, indeed, apply to the prison cell.
32. See Cook v. City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (cell searches
must be reasonable, i.e., related to legitimate governmental objective); O'Connor
v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981) (prisoner has privacy and property in-
terests in items legitimately possessed); Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (inmate has legitimate expectation of privacy that legitimately pos-
sessed items will not be wantonly destroyed or confiscated); Thornton v. Redman,
435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977) (inmate retains privacy interest in items of per-
sonal property in cell). Contra Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973)
(cell block not a constitutionally protected area), affd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.
1974).
33. See Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970) (search of cell violates the
fourth amendment if done for harassment or in cruel and unusual manner); Peo-
ple v. Elkins, 60 111. App. 3d 883, 377 N.E.2d 569 (1978) (limited fourth amendment
protections in cells); State v. Wilmot, - R.I. -, 461 A.2d 401 (1983) (inmate re-
tains limited expecation of privacy in cell; searches must be reasonable). Contra
Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1975) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in a prison cell); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 284 S.E.2d 809 (1981)
(fourth amendment protections are inconsistent with constant surveillance of
inmates).
34. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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chiatric evaluation. Hinckley's cell was subject to frequent searchers
"primarily for 'items with which he could harm himself.' "35 During
one of these searches, a prison guard, claiming his "eye was caught by
certain 'trigger words,' "36 read some of Hinckley's personal writings.
In the course of subsequent searches Hinckley's personal writings
were further read.3 7 Prison officials, after consultation with the
F.B.I., eventually decided to seize Hinckley's personal writings and di-
ary as contraband. Hinckley had attempted to conceal these writings
by storing them with correspondence from his attorney.38 Govern-
ment officials argued that reading the materials was reasonable in the
light of the "trigger words,"39 and if not reasonable, then justified by
concern for internal security.40 The court rejected these arguments
and found that the government had violated Hinckley's fourth amend-
ment right to privacy.
4 1
The court's analysis42 was premised on its assertion that "the
preeiminent value underlying the fourth amendment, the right to
freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, must and can be
recognized even in a detention context."4 3 Three factors played signif-
icant roles in the court's holding that the fourth amendment had been
violated: Hinckley's subjective expectation of privacy,44 the guard's
unreasonable reliance on the "trigger words" to read the materials, 45
and the guard's unbridled discretion in reading (i.e., searching) the
materials.46
The court's conclusion that Hinckley had a subjective expectation
of privacy was based on several factors. His personal writings were
deemed to be his "exclusive outlet for private expression. '47 Hinckley
35. Id. at 126.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id. at 126.
41. Id. at 131.
42. Id. at 126, 131.
43. Id. at 129. The Court has determined that "the fourth amendment by its very
terms envisions an accomodation between the right to privacy and the circum-
stances in which that right is asserted: 'analysis under the Fourth Amendment is
always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmen-
tal invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 193, (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Reasonableness in
turn depends "on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right
to personal security free from arbitrary interference.'" Pennsylvania v. Minims,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)).
44. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 130.
46. Id. at 131.
47. Id. at 127, 131.
[Vol. 64:480
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attempted to preserve the privacy of the contents of these writings by
folding and storing them in an envelope with his legal correspon-
dences.48 Finally, Hinckley was given no notice by corrections author-
ities that his personal papers would be read.49 These factors lead the
court to recognize that Hinckley did have an expectation of privacy
despite constant surveillance of his cell and his activities.
In analyzing the "trigger words" that the guard relied upon to read
and further investigate Hinckley's writings, the court found that these
"phrases... 'neither suggested a threat of criminal activity' nor im-
plicated 'special considerations peculiar to the penal system.' "50 In-
terestingly, the court looked beyond the asserted governmental
interest of penal security to determine whether Hinckley's writings
actually threatened this interest. Having found no legitimate justifica-
tion in terms of penal interests for reading these materials, the court
held this action by penal officials was unreasonable.
Finally, the court adverted to the unilateral discretionary acts of
the searching officers. Acknowledging that the courts owe deference
to corrections administrators 1 concerning policies and regulations
formulated to maintain prison security, "that discretion," the court as-
serted, "should and must be corralled by the fourth amendment's pro-
hibition of arbitrary invasions of privacy."52 These guards had acted
in their own discretion; there was no rule, policy, or order from a supe-
rior officer to guide their actions.5 3 Under these circumstances the
search was deemed to be "objectively unreasonable,"54 and "[t]here
was no reasoned, principled decision by the prison administration enti-
tled to deference."55 It is exactly this type of discretionary govern-
48. Id. at 127. See generally Note, Searches of Private Papers: Incorporating First
Amendment Principles into the Determination of Objective Reasonableness, 51
FoRD. L. REv. 967 (1983). The author argues that when a place is given a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy under the Katz test, see infra note 129, then the na-
ture of the item to be seized must also play a part in determining whether an
individual had a legitimate expecation of privacy. This analysis is necessary to
safeguard first amendment principles of free expression that might otherwise be
vulnerable when a place is given diminished fourth amendment protections.
49. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 131. The trigger words cited were "prison," "life sentence," and "coopera-
tion with the Justice Department." 'These words," the court stated, "are hardly
of a nature that suggests an imminent or even remote threat to security." Id. at
132. Cf. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983) (reading diary entry that
corresponded with riot date found during post-riot search did not violate fourth
amendment).
51. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Id. at 130.
55. Id. at 131. See also Beckett v. Powers, 494 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Wis. 1980). In Beck-
ett, the court held that deference to prison administrative practices that infringed
constitutional rights was based on a three-part test 1) the practice serve the
1985]
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mental action that the fourth amendment was designed to prohibit.
The Hinckley opinion highlights several factors that were charac-
teristic of pre-Hudson analysis of fourth amendment rights in prison
cells. There was a general assumption that fourth amendment protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures would apply to a lim-
ited degree. Court analysis of legitimate prison objectives and needs
was undertaken. When the interests were shown to be legitimate, ju-
dicial deference to the judgments of prison authorities was the norm.
In Bonner v. Coughlin,56 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that "a prisoner enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment against unreasonable searches, at least to some minimal
extent."57 In Bonner, the appellant alleged prison guards had violated
"his constitutionally protected interest in privacy and property."5 8 A
shakedown search of the appellant's cell resulted in his cell being left
in a shambles and his trial transcript missing.59 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that the injury was not compen-
sable and the guards' reliance on a valid prison regulation provided a
good faith defense.60 The Court of Appeals rejected this ruling and
rationale.
The Bonner court premised its decision on prior cases that had
found various constitutional rights applicable in the prison context,
albeit only to a limited degree.61 Dignity of the individual,62 whatever
his status, also played a determinative role in the decision. The deci-
sion did not, however, reach the merits of the reasonableness of the
search. Nor did it outline the contours or the scope of the fourth
amendment's applicability in the prison cell.63 Since the appellant
needs of the institution for security, order, and discipline; 2) the practice reflect
informed judgment of prison administrators; and 3) the practice not be an exag-
gerated response to legitimate institutional needs.
56. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), affd on reh'g, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
57. Id. at 1317.
58. Id. at 1312.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1314. Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 401
provided guidelines for shakedown searches. Id. at 1313 n.6.
61. Id. at 1315.
62. Id. at 1316. On this issue the court stated:
Respect for the dignity of the individual compels a comparable conclu-
sion [i.e., retained constitutional rights] with respect to his interest in
privacy. Unquestionably, entry into a controlled environment entails a
dramatic loss of privacy. Moreover, the justifiable reasons for invading
an inmate's privacy are both obvious and easily established. We are per-
suaded, however, that the surrender of privacy is not total and that some
residuum meriting the protection of the Fourth Amendment survives
the transfer into custody.
Id.
63. The court left open the issue of whether "mere existence of a prison regulation
authorizing random shakedowns" was enough to defend against an alleged fourth
[Vol. 64:480
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predicated his complaint on the absence of "a warrant, probable cause,
or his consent," 64 the court decided the reasonableness issue on this
basis. It held that "whatever the level of the prisoner's Fourth
Amendment protection, it does not rise to that possessed by the unin-
carcerated members of society."65 A fourth amendment claim was es-
tablished, however, by the alleged taking of the appellant's trial
transcript.66 If, at trial, the inmate could prove that the guards seized
the transcript, "the defendants would then have the burden of estab-
lishing the 'reasonableness' of the seizure."6 7
This decision is significant in several respects. It recognizes that
"the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual,"68 regardless of
status, are values that the fourth amendment protects. Privacy and
property rights of incarcerated individuals, though not extensive, are
protected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrants, probable cause, or consent, traditional fourth
amendment safeguards, were not elements of the reasonableness test
to determine whether a prisoner's fourth amendment rights have been
violated.
Another interesting case is United States v. Chamorro.69 In
Chamorro, the appellant, an inmate at Walpole Prison, was suspected
of sending a book-bomb through the mail.70 Pursuant to instruc-
tions71 guards at the prison conducted a search of appellant's cell. Ev-
idence linking the appellant to the bombing was uncovered and
seized.72 Appellant contested the search as "unreasonable and [viola-
tive] of his fourth amendment right to privacy."73
The Chamorro court held that an inmate does, in fact, retain "some
residuum of fourth amendment protection."74 A more difficult issue
was the extent to which fourth amendment protections would apply in
an inmate's cell. Rather than adopt a definitive rule the court opted
for a "case-by-case determination," 75 in light of the factual situation.
amendment violation or whether "additional data" would be needed to assess the
reasonableness of the search. Id. at 1317.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1316.
69. 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id. The evidence seized was an electrical dictionary and a return address label
that had aroused the searching guards' suspicion. This label later was found to
match the nonexistent return address that was on the mailed bomb.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4. Before Chauorro this question had not been definitively decided by the
First Circuit.
75. Id.
1985]
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The court held that the search was reasonable under the facts
presented.76 The search was not intrusive, intended to harass, or
"solely for the purpose of gathering evidence of a crime."77 Seizure of
the appellant's property was also analyzed by this reasonableness test
and upheld. Thus, the Chamorro opinion added two important ele-
ments to the mosaic of pre-Hudson case law: 1) that the scope of the
fourth amendment protections should be decided on a case-by-case ba-
sis in light of the factual situation; and 2) that the reasonableness test
is a multifactor test that balances the interests of all parties
concerned.
O'Connor v. Keller,7 8 offers another piece in the pattern of how
courts, prior to Hudson, adjudicated prisoners' fourth amendment
rights cases. In O'Connor, the plaintiff inmate's cell was searched for
contraband, specifically sandpaper.7 9 During the search, items legiti-
mately possessed by O'Connor were also confiscated.8 0 O'Connor vig-
orously protested this seizure. The guard, in justification of his
actions, merely explained that O'Connor was "over the limit of
books."8s A shoving match ensued and O'Connor was subsequently
76. Id. at 5. The Chamorro court adopted the reasonableness test set out in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), for determining "the validity of body cavity
searches." The Court in Bell stated:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable
of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope
of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the jus-
tification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559.
77. United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1982). It appears that the court
was less than candid in making this statement. Since it was known that the ap-
pellant was suspected in bombing, his cell was the only one searched, and the
guards were instructed to look specifically for bomb-making material, it can be
assumed that the purpose of the search was to obtain evidence of a crime.
Whether this would have made a difference on the warrant requirement is uncer-
tain since the court held that no warrant to search was required. Surely prison
authorities have an interest in security threatened by an inmate's bomb-making
capacity that would render a search reasonable without a warrant. Cf. People v.
Gibson, 1 PRISON L. REP. 254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (seizure of an inmate's palm-
prints and blood-type without a warrant was illegal, no reasonable relation of
search to objectives of prison administration). Accord State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C.
494, 224 S.E.2d 666 (1976). See also Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and
Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA.
L. REV. 1045 (1976) (arguing that when non-institutional motives (i.e., obtaining
evidence of crime) prompt a prison search, warrants should be required).
78. 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981).
79. Id. at 1361.
80. Id. These items were approved magazines, books, and music cassette tapes. The
court concluded that according to prison regulations O'Connor had legitimate
possession of these items.
81. Id. at 1362.
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subdued and placed into isolation.8 2 O'Connor brought a section 1983
action for violation of his constitutional rights.
The court found that an inmate did retain some fourth amendment
protections, concluding:
[A] prisoner has protectable privacy and property interests in items of per-
sonal property he legitimately possesses, and that these interests are infringed
when prisoner officials seize such property in an unreasonable manner or
without a legitimate justification. Once a prisoner has proven the confiscation
of legitmately possessed property, the burden is on the prison officials to es-
tablish the reasonability of the seizure.
8 3
Factors utilized in determining the reasonableness of the search was
set out.84 Though the purpose of the search was legitimate, the court
held that the seizure was "unreasonable and without justification."8 5
For this constitutional violation86 the court assessed compensatory
and punitive damages.8 7
Important aspects of the O'Connor decision included the fact that
the court looked to existing prison regulations for aid in assessing the
inmate's interests and whether the guard's actions were violative of
those interests.8 8 Discretionary guard actions, beyond those necessary
to effect the legitimate purpose of the search, were held in check. In
addition, the court adopted a reasonableness test8 9 that assessed the
type of institution as well as the motivation, scope, and supervision of
the search.
In summary, the touchstone of prisoner fourth amendment rights
82. Id. The events surrounding the confinement in isolation and their legal resolu-
tion are not significant for the purpose of this Article.
83. Id. at 1368.
84. Id. at 1368. Factors deemed relevant for determining reasonableness of a search
were adopted from Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1976). These
factors were "the nature of the institution, the reason for and the scope of the
search, the instructions and supervision given to those who carry out the search
[and] the means provided for the return of mistakenly seized property." Id. at
881.
85. O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (D. Md. 1981). The court gave empha-
sis to the inmates reliance on prison regulations that legitimized his possession of
the seized items. The guard's cursory explanation for the seizure, that the inmate
was "over the limit of books," was inadequate to justify the seizure.
86. Id. at 1370. The court concluded these actions also violated the inmate's first,
sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights.
87. Compsensatory damages of $50 and punitive damages of $250 were set against the
defendant-guard for his "seizure... [that] was wholly without justification." Id.
at 1375.
88. Since correction regulations are often promulgated in the discretion of correction
administrators, supra note 10, it might not be automatically assumed that these
regulations are reasonable. But when regulations are in place they provide guide-
lines for determining whether or not the actions of a particular officer, in reliance
on the regulations, are reasonable.
89. O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (D. Md. 1981) (citing Thornton v.
Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876, 881 (D. Del. 1977)).
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cases prior to Hudson was the reasonableness of the search. Fourth
amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures"
reached into the prison cell-to prohibit arbitrary governmental inva-
sion of an individual's privacy or property. Though the various courts
had held that the fourth amendment applied in prison cells, it must be
kept in mind that its degree of application was held to a minimum.
Neither warrants nor probable cause, traditional fourth amendment
safeguards, were required to search in prison cells.9 0 Deference to
prison administrators' authority and expertise9 ' was maintained when
the search was necessary or reasonably related to furthering a legiti-
mate corrections objective.92 Searches unchecked by legitimate regu-
lations or superior's orders,93 or for harassment or abuse purposes,
were not to be tolerated.94 Protection for the privacy/dignity9 5 and
property96 of the inmates was a prominent concern. This flexible
standard adopted by the courts accommodated 97 interest of both par-
90. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1315 (7th Cir. 1975); Cook v.
City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beckett v. Powers, 494 F.
Supp. 364, 365 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 342, 467 P.2d 50,
52 (1970); People v. Elkins, 60 Ill. App. 3d 883, 885, 377 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1978). But
see People v. Gibson, 1 PRISON L. REP. 254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (warrant re-
quired for search and seizure unrelated to prison interests). Accord People v.
Trudeau, 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1971); State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494, 224
S.E.2d 666 (1976).
91. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
92. See DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Chamorro,
687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981);
Cook v. City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Stringer v. Thomp-
son, 537 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Saunders v. Packel, 436 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977); People v. Gibson,
1 PRISON L. REP. 254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972); State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494, 224
S.E.2d 666 (1976).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982); O'Connor v.
Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981).
94. See, e.g., DiGuiseppi v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v.
Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50
(1970); State v. Wilmot, - R.I. _, 461 A.2d 401 (1983).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1975); Wells v. State, 402 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1981). In Wells, one judge stated
that: "fourth amendment protections are minimum standards that define civi-
lized treatment of other human beings. To deny persons in a prison environment
all fourth amendment rights is to deny them the quality of humanity." Wells v.
State, 402 So. 2d 402, 409 (Fla. 1981) (Sundberg, C.J., concurring).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Bonner v.
Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.
1974); Cook v. City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); O'Connor v.
Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981); Brown v. Hilton, 492 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J.
1980); Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977).
97. The accommodation principle was stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), as a need for "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
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ties; prison authorities in maintaining correctional institutions accord-
ing to legitimate penological goals, and inmates' interest in privacy
and property. Overall, this standard, while allowing penal administra-
tors necessary latitude for institutional operation, preserved for in-
mates the modicum of dignity, respect, and privacy inherent in their
status as a human being.
III. HUDSON: FACTS, RATIONALE, AND CRITIQUE
A. Facts and Rationale
In Hudson v. Palmer,9 8 the Supreme Court adopted the "bright-
line" rule that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his ce1199 or in his personal property1 0 0 contained therein: "The
Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does
not apply within the confines of the prison cell."lol
In Hudson, Palmer, an inmate at a Virginia correctional facility,
brought a section 1983 suit02 against prison guard Hudson. The suit
alleged that Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's
cell and locker merely to harass Palmer.O3 It also alleged that in the
course of the search Hudson "intentionally destroyed certain noncon-
traband personal property" belonging to Palmer.104 Hudson, denying
the allegations, moved for and was granted summary judgment.
10 5
The district court held that the intentional destruction of property
claim was controlled by the principle enunciated in Parratt v. Tay-
lor.1
0 6 On the harassment issue the district court held "that the al-
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."
Id. at 556.
98. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
99. Id. at 3200.
100. Id. at 3201 n.8.
101. Id. at 3200.
102. Id. at 3197.
103. Id.
104. Id. Palmer claimed a violation of his fourteenth amendment due process right by
the intentional destruction of his letters, legal materials, and personal property.
Id. at 3208 n.3.
105. Id. at 3197.
106. Id. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1982), the Court held that a § 1983 action
for violation of the Due Process Clause could not be maintained against prison
officials for the negligent loss or destruction of an inmate's property as long as
there were adequate state law remedies to compensate for the deprivation. In
Parratt, the Court determined that pre-deprivation procedures were impractical
when the loss was due to a random, unauthorized act of a state employee. Cf.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (post-deprivation procedures
do not satisfy due process when deprivation occurs according to a state plan).
Hudson extended this principle to deliberate destruction of property. In Virginia,
state tort remedies were available to compensate Palmer. Hudson v. Palmer, 104
S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984).
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leged harassment did not rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation."1
07
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit' 08 affirmed
extension of Parratt o the intentional destruction facts.109 It reversed
and remanded, however, on the harassment issue.110 Since there was
a clear factual dispute as to whether the prison had a policy of routine,
shakedown searches, summary judgment was unwarranted.11 In ad-
dition, the court concluded "that Palmer had a limited privacy
right."112 The court did acknowledge the necessity and efficacy of in-
dividual, random, shakedown searches for controlling inmate posses-
sion of contraband.1 3 It was disturbed, however, about the individual
searches and their potential abuse in the hands of malevolent
guards.114 To safeguard against potential abuse of this search tool the
court, on remand, required that such searches be "either . . . done
pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches of
single cells or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or discover
the possession of contraband ... or ... that some reasonable basis
existed for the belief that the prisoner possessed contraband.""15
Central to the Supreme Court's decision reversing the court of ap-
peals was the premise of "the paramount interest in institutional se-
curity."116 Internal security is the foundation upon which the Court
constructs its "bright-line" rule that "recognition of privacy rights for
prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the
concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institu-
tions.""17 Several factors weighed in the construction of this rule.
Initially, the Court noted the violent and "volatile" atmosphere
that exists in the nation's prisons."18 To combat potential violence and
107. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3197 (1984).
108. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1983).
109. Id. at 1223.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. Id. at 1223.
112. Id. at 1225. Though the court of appeals termed this a "Fourteenth Amendment
right to privacy," id. at 1222, it is assumed that its basis is in the fourth amend-
ment. This assumption is based on the fact that the court of appeals analysis
focused on cases that previously recognized a limited fourth amendment right in
prison cells. Id. at 1224. In addition, the court framed the possible violation as
resulting from a "nonroutine" search. Id. at 1222.
113. Id. at 1224.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 (1984).
117. Id. at 3200.
118. Id. In support of its assertion about the violent atmosphere pervading the na-
tion's prisons the Court stated:
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners
murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of
prison personnel were murdered by prisoners during this period. Over
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control possession of drugs and weapons by inmates it was asserted
that "[u]nfettered access to these cells by prison officials ... is imper-
ative."119 In light of this rationale the Court took issue with the re-
quirements for individual cell searches set out by the court of
appeals.' 20 The Court rejected any requirement for "planned random
searches,"121 because such a requirement "would seriously undermine
the effectiveness of this weapon."1 22 Flexibility was deemed essential
to enable prison administrators to adequately maintain prison secur-
ity. Fourth amendment rights of privacy, in a prison cell, to any de-
gree whatsoever, would interfere significantly with this requisite
flexibility.
The Court did express concern about the possibility of harassment
unrelated to prison needsm2s by "prison attendants."' 2 4 As a remedy to
such activity the Court asserted that the "Eighth Amendment always
stands as a protection against 'cruel and unusual punishments.' "125
For wanton destruction of an inmate's personal property there existed
"adequate state tort and common law remedies." 12 6
In its legal analysis, the Court employed the test set out in Katz v.
United States.27 The Court utilized a straight balancing test to deter-
mine whether an inmate had a legitimate or reasonable "expectation
29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these facilities.. . and
there were over 125 suicides .... [I]nformal statistics of the U.S. Bu-
reau of Prisons show that in the federal system during 1983, there were
11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other inmates, 227 inmate
assualts on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system
in 1981 and 1982 over 750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570
inmate assaults on prison personnel.
Id (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 3200.
120. Id. at 3201. See supra note 120.
121. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 (1984).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3202.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3199-200. Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was a landmark in
fourth amendment case law. In Katz the Court held that bugging the outside of a
public telephone booth had "violated the privacy upon which [the user had] justi-
fiably relied... and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353. Intoning the famous phrase "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," id. at 351, the Katz Court reassessed the
"constitutionally protected area test," which was the fulcrum upon which fourth
amendment protections pivoted prior to Katz. In Katz the Court declared that
the "areas" test was "no longer to be regarded as controlling," id. at 353, for the
purposes of fourth amendment analysis. The test for fourth amendment analysis
ultimately gleaned from the pages of Katz comes from the concurring opinion of
Justice Harlan. It states that "there is a two fold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at
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of privacy" in his cell.1 28 After balancing the penal interests of secur-
ity and the prisoner's interest in privacy, the Court "[struck] the bal-
ance in favor of institutional security."' 2 9 Applying the second prong
of the Katz test, the Court concluded "[w]e are satisfied that society
would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to
what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional
security."130
B. Critique
The Court has observed that "[t]he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State."' 3 ' That incarceration is a legiti-
mate intrusion on personal privacy and dignity is clear; that this intru-
sion is totally without any fourth amendment protections is less so.
One of the most disconcerting aspects of the Hudson opinion is the
paucity of substantive analysis by the Court. As the Court acknowl-
edges, "claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given
context"'132 are approached warily. Such prudence should be height-
ened when the context under consideration is a correctional institu-
tion where inmates are rigidly controlled and fundamental
constitutional rights are honored or dishonored beyond the scrutiny of
the public eye.
Internal security of corrections institutions is the foundation upon
which the Court plants its decision. 3 3 Undoubtedly, this is an issue of
great importance to correctional authorities, society, and the inmates
themselves: "However, the shibboleth of jail security is not a passport
to wholesale abuse of ... constitutional rights."134 That inmates' con-
stitutional rights are not withdrawn in the prison context is well es-
tablished.135 Moreover, the "mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general applicability" 3 6 has been the applicable stan-
dard in prisoners' rights cases. In the instant case there was no
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is the second prong of this test that is currently
recognized in fourth amendment jurisprudence as the effective Katz test.
128. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
129. Id. at 3201.
130. Id.
131. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
132. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
133. Id. at 3201.
134. State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494, 500, 224 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1976) (search by a detec-
tive, unrelated to jail staff, for purposes unrelated to jail security impermissible;
for such an exploratory search a warrant or probable cause was necessary).
135. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
136. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
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substantive evidence offered that required the total negation of fourth
amendment protections in the prison cell.
The Court asserted that "unfettered access"1 3 7 to inmates' cells
was required to insure prison security. Prior to Hudson, prison au-
thorities had "unfettered access" to search inmates' cells for contra-
band or other legitimate penal objectives. Neither warrants, probable
cause, nor inmate consent was required before such a search of a cell
could be made.1 38 Prison interests in "ferretting" out contraband of
any type were more than adequately safeguarded by the minimal ex-
tent to which courts had extended fourth amendment protections into
prison cells. What was prohibited were maliciously motivated
searches or those that had no relation to legitimate penal objectives,
such as security.13 9
In rejecting the analysis of the court of appeals, the Hudson Court
stated that "[a] requirement that even random searches be conducted
pursuant to an established plan would seriously undermine the effec-
tiveness of this weapon."140 The Court appears to have misinterpreted
what the court of appeals held. Rather than "planned random
searches", 41 the court of appeals remanded to determine whether
there was "an established program of conducting random searches." 142
This distinction is significant. As the Court points out, "planned ran-
dom searches" could be subject to decoding and anticipation by in-
mates, thus depriving prison authorities of an essential element of
surprise. The court of appeals, however, also advocated the use of ran-
137. Palmer v. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
138. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311,1315 (7th Cir. 1975); Cook v.
City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179,182 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beckett v. Powers, 494 F.
Supp. 364, 365 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 342, 467 P.2d 50,
52 (1970); People v. Elkins, 60 IM. App. 3d 883, 885, 377 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1978). But
see People v. Gibson, 1 PRISON L. REP. 254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972); People v. Tru-
deau, 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d.890 (1971); State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494, 224
S.E.2d 666 (1976). Several commentators have advocated standards for prison
searches that reflect the motive of the search. Law enforcement searches would
require greater fourth amendment protection, whereas administrative searches
(i.e., security, contraband) would require less. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra
note 77, at 1077-81; Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A
Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Pro-
cess in our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669, 701 (1972).
139. See DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. Chamorro,
687 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Vallez, 663 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.
1981); Cook v. City of New York, 578 F. Supp. 179,182 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Stringer v.
Thompson, 537 F. Supp. 133, 136 (N.D. 11l. 1982); Saunders v. Packel, 436 F. Supp.
618, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876, 880 (D. Del. 1977);
People v. Gibson, 1 PRISON L. REP. 254 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972); State v. Ellefson,
266 S.C. 494, 501, 224 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1976).
140. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 (1984).
141. Id.
142. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1224 (4th Cir. 1983).
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dom searches, even for individual shakedowns,143 thus retaining the
element of surprise. By attempting to ascertain whether there was an
"established program" for random searches, the court of appeals was
prohibiting discretionary (i.e., arbitrary) searches instituted at a
guard's own behest. This interpretation is especially plausible in light
of the evil that the court of appeals sought to thwart, namely harass-
ment motivated searches.144 Protection against arbitrary governmen-
tal searches is a fundamental value of fourth amendment
jurisprudence. 14 5 With its decision in Hudson, the Supreme Court has
left prison inmates without fourth amendment protections against po-
tentially abusive, arbitrary searches initiated at a line guard's own dis-
cretion.146 Despite the Court's assertion to the contrary, the eighth
amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual punishment"
will not protect prison inmates against ignominous harassment
searches.147
As has been its wont in fourth amendment cases recently,148 the
143. The court stated: "We recognize that allowing the prison authorities to adopt a
program of random individual searches may provide an increased opportunity for
prison officials to abuse that power and utilize searches as a means of harass-
ment; however, the device is of such obvious utility in achieving the goal of prison
security that we do not think that the risk outweighs the benefit." Id. at 1224
(emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
146. That a prison guard would have too much discretionary latitude for searching is a
serious problem. General warrants and their indiscriminate nature were one of
the evils against which the fourth amendment was directed. See Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 366 (1974). Re-
moval of the fourth amendment from the prison context shields a significant
amount of government activity from judicial review: "The question of what con-
stitutes a covered 'search' or 'seizure' would and should be viewed with an appre-
ciation that to exclude any particular police activity from coverage is essentially
to exclude if from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness,
whereas to include it is to do no more than say that it must be conducted in a
reasonable manner." Id. at 393. Tensions inherent in guard-inmate relations in
the prison atmosphere could lead to misuse by a guard of his power of discretion-
ary search. This authority should not be left unchecked by judicial review.
147. 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984). It appears that the Court is less than candid in mak-
ing this assertion, especially in light of the fact that the district court had previ-
ously found, and was upheld by the court of appeals, that the actions alleged in
the instant case did "not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." See Palmer
v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1221 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983). Comment has also been made
on the eighth amendment's variability of meaning, making it unreliable as a vin-
dicator of prisoner liberty or privacy rights. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note
77 at 1052. The authors state that "[a]pparently few, if any, courts have actually
invalidated a prison search as a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause." Id. at 1069 n.160.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (lawful stop of vehicle justified
by probable cause sanctions search of entire vehicle and containers therein that
might harbor the item sought); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (lawful
custodial arrest of automobile occupant justifies search of passenger compart-
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Court in Hudson pronounced a bright-line rule.149 Such rules, while
providing a clearer guide to law enforcement officials, often result in
unfair treatment for cases that fall within the periphery of the rule.150
One commentator has asserted that the traditional case-by-case adju-
dication communicates sufficiently the standards, values, and guides to
be used in search and seizure situations.' 5 '
Professor LaFave, an advocate of the clarity and guidance for law
enforcement officials that "bright-line" rules instill, proposed a
formula for determining whether a "bright-line" rule should be imple-
mented.152 By the criteria set out in Professor LaFave's formula it
appears that the Court was overreaching in enunciating a "bright-
line" rule in Hudson. Arguably, answers to three out of the four ques-
tions posed by the formula would have counseled against creation of a
ment of automobile and all containers therein); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979) ("detention for custodial interrogation" requires probable cause under
the fourth amendment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full
search incident to custodial arrest is an exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement and is reasonable). See also Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and
the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 227 (1984); LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment In An Imperfect Worl&d On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good
Faith", 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982).
149. 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198 (1984). This "bright-line" rule, "that prisoners have no legiti-
mate expectations of privacy in their individual cells ... [entitling] them to
Fourth Amendment protection," was advocated by the Petitioner.
150. See Alschuler, supra note 148, at 231. The author rejects the use of "bright-line"
rules in the fourth amendment area; injustice is too frequent and the boundaries
of even a "bright-line" rule can be difficult to apply. The author sets out two
types of bright-line rules: 1) where the search and seizure will be unconstitu-
tional, though, if viewed in isolation it would be reasonable (i.e., where an entire
class of police actions are deemed unfair, and 2) upholding police acts that might
be unconstitutional if viewed in isolation. This type of rule expands police discre-
tion (Hudson employs this type of rule). Interestingly it is noted that bright-line
rules are employed more often in expanding search powers of police rather than
in curtailing these powers; witness Ross, Belton, and now Hudson.
151. See Alschuler, supra note 148, at 236. This author asserts also that courts should
not be involved in developing "bright-lines" for the sake of administrative con-
venience. The judicial function of deciding the particular case at hand is not well
suited for creation of prospective, prophylactic "bright-line" rules. Legislatures
are the more appropriate forum for such endeavors. Concomitantly, the notion
that an individual should suffer an injustice for the sake of judicial administrative
convenience is one difficult to reconcile with the precept of fairness.
152. See LaFave, supra note 148. This formula is composed of four questions:
1) Does the rule have clear and certain boundaries; so that it in fact
makes case-by-case evaluation and adjudication unnecessary?
2) Does it produce results approximating those which would be ob-
tained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying principle
were practical?
3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case application
of a principle because that approach has proved unworkable?
4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse?
Id. at 325-26.
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'%right-line" rule by the Hudson Court. Results from the Hudson
"bright-line" rule are not likely to approximate "those which would be
obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying princi-
ple were practical."s3 Though prior to Hudson the success rate of
such suits was arguably not high, total negation of fourth amendment
protections in this area transforms once potentially successful suits
into unmitigated failures. Such failure does not approximate potential
success even if such success came at a minimal rate.
No evidence has been presented to date demonstrating that fourth
amendment prisoner rights cases had proved meddlesome for lower
courts to adjudicate. Deference to penological authorities was a guide
to court decisons; abdication of judicial review of fundamental consti-
tutional rights was not. Case-by-case adjudication proved "workable"
and a "bright-line" rule seemed unnecessary. Finally, it appears that
such a '"right-line" rule is "subject to manipulation and abuse."l54
Without judicial review of search procedures within corrections insti-
tutions the likelihood for harassment searches is potentially increased.
Hudson itself is a case in point where an inmate alleged that a search
was motivated solely to harass. As an admonishment Professor
LaFave wrote: "In particular, it is necessary for courts to resist the
temptation to draw new, supposedly 'bright,' lines when in fact ex-
isting doctrine is not causing serious problems in day-to-day prac-
tice."15 5 In Hudson v. Palmer, the Supreme Court neglected to heed
this admonition.
As was stated previously, the cavalier manner in which the Court
resolved the Katz balancing test against the privacy interests of prison
inmates is troubling. The doctrine, "that society is not prepared to
recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a
prisoner might have in his prison cell,"35 6 while plausible, is not sub-
stantiated by any objective criteria. Mechanics of prison security and
reasons why a limited fourth amendment right of privacy in a prison
cell would be "incompatible" therewith were never broached by the
Court.157 The objective prong of the Katz test, as applied by the Hud-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 333. See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient
can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.") (citing Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
156. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
157. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 77, at 1066-1070. These commentators pro-
posed a fourth amendment model for application in prisons. Traditional fourth
amendment values, such as dignity, privacy, personal security, and property
would still be retained as if the individual were free. The state interest, however,
would change. A balancing process would determine the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection retained by the inmate. The objective (i.e., societal) prong of the
balancing test would require principled analysis, not mere uttering of shib-
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son Court, displays few characteristics of objectivity at all.15s Factors
that might objectively indicate that inmates do not retain privacy in-
terest are noticeably absent. 159 Merely citing statistical data concern-
ing violence in prison or the disreputable character of prison
inhabitants160 is an insufficient basis for the total withdrawal of a fun-
bolethic incantations. As premised in Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th
cir. 1944), inmates would retain all rights except those expressly or necessarily
lost as a result of confinement. In Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), the
Court maintained that "[lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." Though retraction, withdrawal,
and limitation of rights due to incarceration are well-nigh inevitable, the basis for
such actions should be actual, rather than fanciful, especially in the case of funda-
mental constitutional rights that demark the minimum standard of treatment
that must be accorded to individuals by the states.
158. Justice Stevens makes this point in his dissenting opinion in Hudson: "Its percep-
tion of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any
empirical data; rather it merely reflects the perception of the four Justices who
have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored." Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3212 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Some commentators
have expressed similar views. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 146, at 403 (inter-
ests deserving of fourth amendment protections are value judgments determined
by the Court); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945, 983
(1977) (balancing tests are influenced by who decides the interests and factors to
be weighted; selecting the interests can predetermine the result).
159. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) the Court stated:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society ... Expectations of privacy protected by
Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law in-
terest in real or personal property, or the invasion of such interest.
These ideas were rejected both in Jones, and Katz. But by focusing on
legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in de-
termining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by
that Amendment.
Id. at 144 n.12. In Rakas, the Court held that since the petitioner asserted no
possessory interest in items seized during an illegal search, he lacked the requi-
site standing to claim a violation of his fourth amendment right. See also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979) ("In determining whether a qegitimate
expecation of privacy' existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be
proper."). See generally Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth
Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1 (1981).
These commentators argue that state and federal law should be the outside
sources utilized for determining legitimate expectations of privacy, thus allowing
state flexibility in expanding the scope of fourth amendment protection.
160. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984). From the tone of its opinion the
Court seems to advocate a retributive view of penology rather than a rehabilita-
tive view. Many states, however, have expressed rehabilitation and resocializa-
tion as goals of their correctional institutions. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 14;
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18; MoNT. CONST. art II, § 28; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; N.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; ORE. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15; Wyo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15.
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damental constitutional right. Vacuous balancing tests offer little in
the way of principled guidance for fourth amendment
jurisprudence.1
6 1
In Hudson, the Court also determined that any item an inmate
might possess is also bereft of fourth amendment protections.162 The
fourth amendment by definition protects possessory as well as privacy
interests.1 63 That the Court would deprive an inmate of any fourth
amendment interest in items legitimately possessed is puzzling.164
161. See generally Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN.
L. REv. 335 (1978). This commentator propounds the general thesis that the Bur-
ger Court has eradicated the prexisting fourth amendment structure, having in-
stead moved toward a standard of "fundamental fairness," a due process standard
by which the states have always been bound for adjudicating fourth amendment
issues. Using such a standard, analysis for arriving at fourth amendment privacy
principles is vague or non-existent; emphasis is placed on the government reason
for an invasion rather than on the fact of the invasion itself. This approach re-
sults in less concern for the individual liberties, a dramatic switch from the War-
ren Court era. The Katz decision, once deemed a vehicle for expanding fourth
amendment protections, is instead used to curtail fourth amendment protections.
Three basic reasons are advanced for the Burger Court's approach: 1) less con-
cern with the Court's function as a protector of fundamental liberties; 2) rising
crime rates prompted the Court to distinguish between constitutional guarantees
necessary for accurate fact-finding and those not so required (the fourth amend-
ment fits the latter category); and 3) an increased emphasis on the federalism
concept. See also Lewis, Hail The State, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1984, at A19, col. 5.
Interestingly, the Court's decision in Hudson substantiates much of the thesis
advocated by Professor Yackle. In Hudson, the Court engages a vague balancing
test that places emphasis on the reason for the search, i.e., prison security, rather
than the individual liberties, i.e., personal privacy, that are being invaded. Only
searches constituting violations of the eighth amendment, i.e., a violation of fun-
damental fairness, would be deemed unconstitutional and actionable.
162. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 n.8 (1984) ("Prison officials must be free
to seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institu-
tional interests.")
163. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 437, 353 (1967), held that the "constitutionally
protected area" test was no longer "controlling" for the purposes of determining
whether the fourth amendment applied to a given situation. That the "legitimate
expectations of privacy" test has totally displaced the "areas" test (based on prop-
erty concepts) has not been accepted. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44,
n.12 (1978). In fact, some courts have used the "areas test" to deny inmate claims
to fourth amendment protections. See United States v. Kelly, 393 F. Supp. 755
(W.D. Okla. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973); Common-
wealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 308 N.E.2d 538 (1974). Many commentators
have asserted that the Katz privacy test and the property concepts of the "areas"
test are supplementary and expand fourth amendment protections. See Amster-
dam, supra note 146, at 385; Yackle, supra note 161, at 369-72; Note, supra note
158, at 970; Note, A Reconsideration of Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH.
L.REv. 154, 181 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Reconsideration].
164. Justice Stevens, in dissent, is equally incredulous that the majority's opinion goes
so far. Justice Stevens stated that Palmer legitimately possessed the items seized
as a matter of state law (penal regulations sanction this possession), that no "pe-
nological justification" could legitimize the seizure in this case, and viewed such
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Though the Court has previously acknowledged a distinction for pur-
poses of fourth amendment analysis when the item seized implicates
first amendment interests,165 that distinction is lost in Hudson. The
Court is mollified by the fact that Palmer has a state tort remedy to
compensate for the destroyed property.166 But can mere monetary
compensation adequately replace "personal letters, snapshots of a
family ... a diary ... or even a Bible... ?"167 Clearly not.
Incarceration is a degrading and depersonalizing process.16 8 Pris-
ons are rigidly structured for maximum efficiency in sustaining and
maintaining their human wares. Privacy is reduced dramatically by
the necessity of this process. What limited degree of privacy does re-
main should be protected for the inmate's physical and psychological
well-being.169 The Hudson Court failed, however, to take account of
this issue.
The Hudson Court approached the concept of privacy in a stinted
fashion. Privacy was defined as a visual, physical concept. 70 But it
entails much more than that.171 Privacy encompasses thoughts, feel-
arbitrary seizures as violative of the eighth amendment. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.
Ct. 3194, 3208-11 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See Rhoden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (film seized incident to arrest
violated the fourth amendment; when first amendment interests are implicated a
higher standard, of reasonableness is required for seizures.); United States v.
Hincldey, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (through the court premised its ruling on
the fourth amendment, first amendment interests were involved). See generally
Note, Searches of Private Papers: Incorporating First Amendment Principles
Into the Determination of Objective Reasonableness, 51 FoRD. L.REv. 967 (1983).
In Hudson, the items allegedly destroyed included letters and legal documents.
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3209 (1984).
166. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201, n.8 (1984).
167. Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See generally E. Gom AN, ASYLUmS 1-124 (1961); Schwartz, Deprivation of Pri-
vacy As A "Functional Prerequisite" The Case of the Prison, 63 J. OF CRIM. L.
AND CRuvINoLOGY 229 (1972) (prison structure and program designed toward de-
personalization of inmates to enhance efficient management of prison popula-
tion); Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to
Rehabilitation, 20 CATH. U. L.REv. 365 (1971) (prison conditions, from structure
to personnel, impede rehabilitative goal of incarceration).
169. This point is well made by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion when he
states: "[m]easured by the conditions that prevail in a free society, neither the
possessions nor the slight residuum of privacy that a prison inmate can retain in
his cell, can have more than a minimal value. From the standpoint of the pris-
oner, however, that trivial residuum may mark the difference between slavery
and humanity." Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3208 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
170. The Court states: "A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates
and their cells required to insure institutional security and internal order." Id. at
3201.
171. Curiously, the Chief Justice recognized this fact in Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1
(1978), where he wrote:
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ings, and ideas, all of which are capable of being collected into journals
or diaries. Sustaining contact with the outside world also implicates
the concept of privacy.172 Many commentators have linked privacy
with concepts of inherent individual dignity.17 3 Privacy has been con-
ceptualized as control of information about oneself,174 control over
who can sense us,175 and as "the rational context for a number of our
most significant ends such as love, trust and friendship, respect and
self-respect."176 Whatever its definitional contours may be, privacy,
and its alter ego, dignity, are crucial elements for personal growth and
self-respect. This applies to incarcerated individuals as well as the
free.
Though the Supreme Court does not often incorporate sociological
or empirical data when formulating its opinions, 1 77 it does so on occa-
sion.178 The privacy issue in Hudson v. Palmer was one occasion in
which evaluation of sociological and psychological data could have per-
formed a significant and useful function. Former Chief Justice
Charles E. Hughes recognized the usefulness of such information long
It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined,
but they do not lose all civil rights .... Inmates in jails, prisons, or
mental institutions retain certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are
not like animals in zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the
public or media reporters, however "educational" the process may be for
others.
Id. at 5 n.2 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). It was not merely the physical
privacy that Chief Justice Burger sought to protect; such institutions are operated
as to make physical privacy non-existent. It was the dignity of the individual that
the Chief Justice sought to protect. That is why it is doubly curious that in Hud-
son he has ceased his efforts to protect the privacy and dignity of prison inmates.
172. See Homer, Inmate-Family Ties: Desirable but Difficult, 43 FED. PROBATION 47
(1979) (studies show better success rate on probation for those who maintained
strong family ties during incarceration). Knowledge by an inmate that any corre-
spondence with the outside world is subject to arbitrary searches instigated at the
discretion of a guard could chill the desire to correspond. This lack of correspon-
dence in turn might stymie effective re-entry into society.
173. See, e.g., Beaney, The Right To Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 253 (1966); Laufe & Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue:
A Multidimensional Development Theory, 33 J. OF SOCIAL IssuEs 22 (1977).
174. Levin & Askin, Privacy in the Courts: Law and Social Reality, 32 J. OF SOCIAL
IssuEs 138 (1977).
175. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
176. Id. at 385-86 (quoting FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALuES 137-38 (1970)).
177. See, e.g., Haney, Psychology and Legal Change, 4 LAw AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 147
(1980); Melton, Minors and Privacy, Are Legal and Psychological Concepts Com-
patible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455 (1983).
178. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (studies used for determining that
five member juries were unconstitutional); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1963) (Court
took cognizance of the potential impact the "stop and frisk" rule would have on
communities with tense relations with the police); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Court relied on sociological data to support its decision that
school segregation was unconstitutional).
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In Hudson, the Court rested its decision on the security interests of
the correctional authorities. Various studies have shown that in-
creases in prison crowding have deleterious effects on prisoners' phys-
ical and psychological well-being.1S0 Overcrowding can also lead to
increased aggression and assaults within the prison community.'18 An
analogy can be drawn from these studies to the situation the Court
dealt with in Hudson. In each case there is a loss of control over pri-
vacy and personal space. Inmates are helpless to prevent these intru-
sions. Vulnerability to indiscriminate invasion is increased. This loss
is more pronounced in Hudson in that without any fourth amendment
right of privacy, any aspect of an inmate's life, from memory-filled
possessions to intimate writings, is subject to indiscriminate searches
and seizures by penal authorities. There is no recourse from such in-
vasions when there is no right upon which to base a claim. State tort
remedies,18 2 aimed at compensating an inmate for the market value or
replacement cost of destroyed property, are clearly inadequate to com-
pensate for the emotional value often attached to property or for the
perceived privacy invasion itself. These values are especially impor-
tant for inmates subject to the rigors and starkness of institutional
life.
The decision in Hudson neglects to recognize these needs of in-
mates. It is arguable that the Hudson decision, rather than enhancing
prison security, may actually increase aggression and violence within
the prison environment. 8 3 Psychologist Philip Zimbardo has theo-
rized that:
When a dehumanized person has become an object, then it may be that the
only means he can use to get anyone to take him seriously and respond to him
179. Haney, Psychology and Legal Chunge, 4 LAw AND HuMAN BEHAVIOR 149 (1980)
(quoting C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDA-
TION METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 165-66 (1928) ("Protec-
tion both of the rights of the individual and those of society rest not so often on
formulas ... but on correct appreciation of social conditions and a true appraisal
of the actual effect of the conduct.")
180. Altman, Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 ENVIRON. & BEHAVIOR 7 (1976) (vio-
lations of personal space against the desire of the individual leads to tension, con-
flict, or discomfort); D'Atri, Psychophysiological Responses to Crowding, 8
ENVIRON. & BEHAVIOR 237 (1976); Comment, Crowded Prisons: A Review of Psy-
chological and Environmental Effects, 3 LAW AND HUmAN BEHAVIOR 217 (1979)
(when physical density and spatial configurations prevent privacy or adequate
personal space males are particularly stressed; this stress often translates into
increased aggression).
181. See Nacci, Teitelbaum, & Prather, Population Density and Inmate Misconduct
Rates in Federal Prisons, 41 FED. PROBATION 26 (1977) (increased crowding has a
correspondent increase in prison misconduct); Comment, supra note 180, at 220.
182. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 n.8 (1984).
183. An example of the potential disruption is illustrated in O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F.
Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981).
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in an individuated way is through violence.... In one sense, violence and
destruction transform a passive, controlled object into an active, controlling
person. When driven to the wall by forces of deindividuation, the individual
must assert his own force or become indistinguishable from the wall. Condi-
tions which foster deindividuation make each of us a potential assassin. 18 4
The prison environment is geared toward creating human objects
rather than human individuals. This has been the topic of discussion
of many authors.1ss It would be ironic indeed if the Hudson decision
exacerbated, rather than improved, prison conditions and their con-
comitant security difficulties.186
Another issue for consideration is the basic human dignity that in-
heres in every individual. Powerful arguments can be made for the
right of each individual, whether an inmate or a free citizen, to be
treated with basic dignity and respect.'8 7 Commentators have advo-
cated the necessity of affording to every individual a sanctuary of pri-
vacy that would protect the uniqueness of each personality from
arbitrary intrusion by the State. These commentators have argued
that the fourth amendment fulfills such a role.188 Many organiza-
184. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order versus Dei-
ndividuation Impulse and Chaos 1969 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION
204. Zimbardo defines the term "deindividuation" as:
a complex, hypothesized process in which a series of antecedent social
conditions lead to changes in perception of self and others, and thereby
to a lowered threshold of normally restrained behavior. Under appropri-
ate conditions what results is the "release" of behavior in violation of
established norms of appropriateness. Such conditions permit overt ex-
pression of antisocial behavior, characterized as selfish, greedy, power-
seeking hostile, lustful, and destructive."
Id. at 251. Zimbardo also spoke to the issue of dehumanization. This phenome-
non occurs when people view others as less than human and treat them accord-
ingly. He states that "[d]ehumanization is more probable whenever a
numerically large, continuous flow of people has to be managed efficiently and
'processed'." Id. at 296. That prisoners are processed in such a manner is well
documented. See infra note 168. The removal of fundamental rights from pris-
oners reinforces the view some guards possess, that an inmate is an inferior type
of being. See Jacobs & Retsky, Prison Guard, 4 URBAN LIFE 5 (1975). Abuse of
inmates can only increase without substantive rights for them, and as the rash of
prison riots have pointed out, abusive behavior will not be tolerated without
tragic reprisals.
185. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 168, at 1-124 (1961); Schwartz, supra note 168, at 229;
Singer, supra note 168, at 365.
186. See Schwartz, supra note 168 at 239. Schwartz theorizes that increased respect
for the dignity and privacy of inmates will result in increased trust between in-
mates and prison authorities. Hostility will potentially abate thereby enhancing
the overall security of the institution.
187. See generally Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right- A Jurispruden-
tially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOwARD L.J. 145 (1984). Paust
argues that the concept of human dignity has been used by the Supreme Court
with the explicit or implied expectation that it is a fundamental constitutional
right.
188. See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1974)
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tions 8 9 and at least one state1 9 0 have recognized an inmate's right to
such treatment and have sought to protect this right. The Supreme
Court, however, as evidenced by its Hudson decision, is retreating
from its traditional station as the protector of human liberty and dig-
nity, especially of the politically vulnerable and impotent classes.
It is not to be gainsaid that devising fourth amendment standards
for application by law enforcement officials is an arduous endeavor.
This task is even more difficult in the area of corrections institutions.
The state's interest in maintaining security is substantial. But in-
mates' interests in personal privacy and property are also substantial
and should be accounted for; after all, inmates are human beings and
possess as much an affinity for privacy and property as any free citi-
zen. Unjustified invasions of privacy or deprivations of property are
bound to anger inmates as well as free citizens.
On this basis, the Hudson Court's holding that the fourth amend-
ment does not apply in the prison cell appears to be unwise. A better
rule for this difficult area was advocated by the various courts of ap-
peal and lower federal and state courts. The basic premise of this rule
was that the challenged search be reasonable in light of all of the cir-
cumstances, (i.e., that the search be related in some way to a legiti-
mate penological goal). This requirement of reasonableness balanced
the various interests concerned. On the one hand, penal authorities
had wide latitude to search the cells and possessions of inmates.
Neither warrants nor probable cause were required to conduct such
searches. The only requirement was that the search be related to a
legitimate penal interest, such as security or contraband control. In
order to determine whether a search was related to a legitimate penal
interest the courts would weigh various factors such as the motive for
the search, the manner and scope of the search, the institution in
which the search took place (i.e., whether the prison was maximum or
minimum security and the concomitant fluctuating state interest), and
whether the search was guided by prison regulations or orders from a
(Weinreb asserts that the fourth amendment protects a privacy of presence that
is designed to protect personal autonomy); Note, supra note 158, at 987. See gen-
erally Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 163.
189. A.B.A. Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, Tentative Draft of
Standards Relating To the Legal Status of Prisoners, Section 6.6., Rights of Pri-
vacy, 14 AiL CR I. L. RPTR. No. 3 (1977) (as printed in J. GOBERT & COHN,
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 441 (1981)); International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, Part III, art. 7 & 10, cited in Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 622 n.21, 625
P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981).
190. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-11-2-3 (Burns 1981). In light of the Hudson opinion state
courts will be increasingly looked upon for protection of constitutional rights
based on state constitutions. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (advocating in-
creased reliance on state courts and constitutions as bulwarks against unconstitu-
tional deprivations).
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superior officer. These standards appear to have been measures to
proscribe arbitrary and abusive searches instituted at the caprice of
any corrections officer.
On the other hand, inmates' interests in privacy and personal prop-
erty, though minimal, were protected against arbitrary and unreasona-
ble searches. Basic elements of dignity and privacy were
constitutionally maintained for the inmate. Inmate interests did not
interfere with legitimate penal objectives.
In addition, it appears that the benefits of the Hudson rule al-
lowing arbitrary searches of prison cells are tangential in comparison
with the potential negative implications. Tensions between correc-
tions officials and inmates can arguably increase thus imperiling
rather than enhancing security.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer held that the fourth
amendment's protection of individual privacy and property does not
apply to prison inmates. While the Court premised its decision on the
exigencies of prison security, it is arguable that the rule will exacer-
bate rather than enhance this security interest. By needlessly estab-
lishing this '%right-line" rule the Court rejected near unanimous
approval by lower courts of a limited fourth amendment right for in-
mates. The Court is further retreating from its honored position as
the ultimate protector of the rights and dignity of society's vulnerable,
down-trodden classes. Arguably, even for prisoners, "[t]here's some-
thing sad about being a man, but it is a proud thing too."191 In its rush
to create '%right-line" rules for administration of fourth amendment
jurisprudence, the Court, regretfully, has blinded itself to the sadness
and pride of being human.
Christopher McVeigh, '85
191. S. BENET, The Devil and Daniel Webster, in BEST SELECTED WORKS OF STEPHEN
VINCENT BENET 42 (1942).
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